On The Difference Between Tax And Spending Policies In Models With Finite Horizons by William H. Branson & Giampaolo Galli
NBER  WORKING PAPER SERIES 
ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAX AND SPENDING 
POLICIES IN MODELS WITH FINITE HORIZONS 
William H. Branson 
Giampaolo Galli 
Working Paper No. 2557 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
April 1988 
The research reported here is part of  the NBERs research program  in International 
Studies and was done at  the Banca dItalia.  The authors are grateful to  Daniele 
Terlizzese for helpful comments.  Any opinions expressed are those of  the authors 
and not those of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research or  the Banca dItalia. 
Support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. NBER Working  Paper  #2557 
April 1988 
On the Difference  Between  Tax and Spending  Policies 
in Models  with  Finte Horizons 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the Blanchard  (1985) finite  horizon  model  to study how 
taxes  and government  spending  can  be managed  to stabilize  aggregate  demand. 
It is shown  that tax policy  cannot  stabilize  demand  in less time than it  stabilizes the public  debt, but that, if government  spending  is the 
instrument  of  policy,  demand  can  be stabilized  independently  of  the dynamics  of  the debt.  These  results  imply that  if the objective  is to stabilize  the 
debt  while  maintaining  demand  as  close  as possible  to a pre-determined  target 
path,  and taxes are the instrument,  taxes would  have to be changed 
temporarily  as much as feasible.  On the other hand,  if the instrument  is 
government  spending,  it can be changed  gradually  to achieve  the objectives. 
The dynamic  effects of taxes are a straightforward  implication  of the 
intertemporal  budget  constraint,  when it is assumed  that agents  cannot  be 
surprised  by government  policies.  More traditional  dynamics  can be obtained  if it is assumed  that the government  succeeds  in announcing  a policy  and 
implementing  a different  one.  If however  the announcement  is no credible, 
discretion  is inferior  to a predetermined  tax rule. 
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1.  Introduction  and Summary 
It  is well  known that a sufficient  condition  for  tax policy 
to affect consumption  is that agents'  horizon be shorter  than that 
of  government.  In  this  case  a  decrease in taxes today  boosts 
consumption  of  the  present  generation  because  some  other 
generation  will pay the higher  taxes  which will  have to be raised 
in  the  future  to  finance  the  deficit.  If  agents'  life  is 
stochastic,  consumption  will  be  affected  because there  is some 
probability  that  those  currently  living will not be there  to pay 
for future taxes. 
The main implication  of these propositions for macroeconomic 
modelling  is  that  the  time  pattern  of consumption  depends on the 
time  profile  of  taxes  and  of the public  debt.  This fact has of 
course been  recognized  at least  since Modigliani  and Brumberg laid 
down the  life—cycle  theory  of household  behaviour  in 1954  and Ando 
and  Modigliani  (1963)  estimated  the  resulting  equation  for 
consumption  expenditure. 
A  difficulty  that  has always been recognized  with  the  life 
cycle  theory  concerns  aggregation;  even with the most convenient 
assumptions  concerning  individual  behaviour,  exact aggregation 
over  agents  of  different  ages proves to be an impossible  task. 
Blanchard  (1985)  solved  the  problem  of aggregation  by assuming 2 
that  every  period  each agent faces  the same constant probability 
of  death.  While  this  assumption  has its limitations,  Blanchard's 
finite  horizon model  provides an interesting  framework  to inquire 
with a new blend of rigor  into  issues which have  long been central 
to  macroeconomic  theory  and  policy.  In a recent  paper Gaul  and 
Masera  (1988)  have  used  an open economy version  of Blanchards 
model  to answer the following  question.  Suppose an exogenous shack 
(e.g. an increase  in the world rate of interest)  causes  the public 
debt  to  start  rising:  does a combination  of fiscal  and monetary 
policy  exist  that  stabilizes  the public debt while keeping income 
along  some  predetermined  path  (so as to avoid both unemployment 
and inflation)? 
The  core  of the problem is the  following,  Aggregate demand 
is a function  of both the  flows  (of taxes and government  spending 
and  the  stock  of the debt.  When the  latter  starts  to rise  and  the 
government  reduces  spending  or increases  taxes  in order  to meet 
the  solvency  requirement  there  are  two  conflicting  forces  on the 
level  of activity originating  from a rising stock and a declining 
flow,  Galli and Masera show  that a under rather  general  conditions 
it  is possible to reduce j2ymsendin  at a rate which just 
compensates  the  effects  of a growing  debt on the  level  activity. 
The  ensuing  policy  prescription  is  that  spending  be reduced 
gradually. 
The  work  of Galli  and Masera focussed on government spending 
as  the  instrument;  nothing  is said about taxes,,  which are held 
constant  in  the  analysis.  It  turns out that in this model the 
economics  of  tax  policy  is  very  different from  that  of public 
spending.  The  effects  of these  two policies differ  for  reasons 
which  go  well  beyond  those  popularized  by  Haavelmo's (1945) 
analysis of the balanced budget  multiplier. 
The  basic  point  that we make  here is that  there  exists  no 
tax  policy  that  can decouple the growth of consumption  from that 
of  the  debt.  No matter how fast  taxes  are  increased,  consumption 3 
continues  to  rise  as  long as the  stock  of debt  rises;  in other 
words  in  this  model,  independen-ly  of  the  values  of  the 
parameters,  stock  effects  always dominate. 
In  order  to  maintain  income  as  close  as possible to a 
predetermined  path  in the face of shocks,  taxes must temporarily 
be  changed  as much as is feasible so as to quickly stabilize  the 
debt.  In formal  terms,  the solution to the problem  of minimizing a 
loss  function in the deviation of income  from  target is to achieve 
a discrete change  in the stock of debt,  which requires  an infinite 
instantaneous  flow  rate  of  taxation.  This  policy  allows the 
authorities  to  immediately  attain the target.  In economic terms 
this  means changing  the  stock  of the debt by the stroke of a pen. 
Even  if  one  rules  out extreme solutions,  it still  remains that 
shock  treatment,  rather  than gradualism,  is the prescription  of 
this  model when taxes,  rather than  spending,  are  the instrument  of 
policy. 
The  following  proposition further  highlights  the difference 
between  tax  and  spending  policies.  When government  spending is 
increased, there exists no sequence  of present  and  future  taxes  of 
finite  size that  can avoid fluctuations  of the level  of activity. 
When  spending  is  increased,  the  debt starts to rise: until it 
reaches  a  position  of  rest,  consumption  continues  to rise.  If 
taxes  are  raised as much as spending so as to keep the budget in 
balance,  income  rises  as in Haavelmo's  model.  In order  to avoid 
the  increase in income,  taxes must be  increased  by more:  the debt 
then  starts  to fall and so does consumption  until  the system  has 
reached  a  new steady  state.  In substance,  if taxes are raised so 
as to keep the debt constant, income  varies;  if they are raised by 
the  amount that is necessary to stabilize  income,  the  debt  starts 
to vary and so do consumption  and  income. 
The  sharp  asymmetry  between the  dynamic  effects  of tax and 
spending  policies  in this model is,  in our view,  rather puzzling 
and  worth  some investigation  in order  to understand  its economic 4 
significance  and the extent to which it iz  jecific  to the chosen 
model. 
In  section  2  we  set up  the  simplest  version  of  the  model 
which  is  necessary  to obtain the results  the economy is closed, 
labour  is  the only factor of production and prices  are  fixed.  In 
section  3  we  derive  the  basic  results.  In section 4 we give  an 
economic  interpretation  of  the  results.  The basic  suggestion is 
that  these results are straightforward  implications  of the  inter— 
temporal  budget  constraint  when agents know  the policy rule  and 
expectations  about future non—interest income are consistent  with 
the  model.  Nore  traditional  dynamics can  be obtained in two ways. 
The  first one  is to introduce  liquidity constraints  in this  case 
the  intertemporal  budget  is not the  relevant  constraint  for  the 
maximization  problem.  This approach has been extensively  developed 
in the  literature. 
The  second  possibility  is  to  assume  that agents can be 
surprised  by government  policies.  We develop  this  second approach 
and  construct  an  example  in  which  agents  may have  incorrect 
forecasts  about  taxes  but  are  rational  in the sense  that they 
compute  future  income  in a way which is consistent  with the model 
subject  to  the  expected  policy.  It is shown  that,  given a loss 
function  in  the  deviation  of  income  from  target, a tax policy 
exists  that  hits  the target in every  period.  Furthermore,  under 
these  assumptions,  it  is possible to derive an expression  which 
closely  resembles  the consumption function  estimated  by Ando and 
Nodigliani (1963>. 
In  section  5  we revert  to the hypothesis  that  agents know 
the  future  policy  and characterize  the dynamic  behaviour  of the 
economy  under  the  two  assumptions  of  precommittment  and 
discretion.  With  precommittment,  the  loss  function,  while 
positive,  attains  a lower  value than under discretion  because the 
government  decides  its  strategy  using  the  full  set  of 
expectational constraints  implied  by the model. 5 
The  main  point  is that the as5umption of time consistency 
acts as a constraint  on the  public  autorities  which,  although  not 
powerless  as  in a Ricardian  world,  tiil  cannot achieve the  full 
range  of  macroeconomic  objectives  which  traditional  analysis 
associates with tax policy. 
This  conclusion  is much more  general than the model which is 
used  in  this  paper. It holds  as well  if investment  and a  foreign 
sector  are  introduced  or  if  prices  are  assumed to be market 
clearing.  In  different  or  more  complex  models,  the  lack  of 
controllability  of the demand  for consumption  will  be reflected  on 
different variables  or on the same  variables in different  ways. 
2.  The  Theoretical  Framework 
We  consider  the  simplest IS—LM economy in which  labour  is 
the  only  factor  of production  and the price of goods in terms  of 
money  is  fixed  and  normalized  to  1.  The  government  budget 
constraint  is  explicitly  considered  and  states  that  current 
expenditure  (including  interest>  is financed through  taxes,  short 
term  bonds  or money.  The only complication  relative  to the text- 
book  model  concerns  the  consumption  function  whose derivation 
follows Blanchard (1985). 
Denote  by  c(s,t),  y(s,t),  m(s,t),  w(s,t),  h(s,t) 
consumption,  non—interest  income,  money balances,  assets  (money 
plus  short  term  government  bonds)  and human wealth  of an agent 
born  at  time  s,  as of time t. Let  r(t)  and  t(t)  be the interest 
rate  and  lump  sum taxes at time  t. p and  9 denote the probability 
of  death  and  the discount  rate and  are both constant.  Under the 
assumption  that  the  instantaneous  utility  is logarithmic,  the 
agent maximizes 
1  5t J [  in c (s,v) + (i—a)  ln mJe8t_av 6 
The  individual  has  a contract  with an in  occ company according 
to which the company  inherits the agent  wealth {ircluding  money) 
in exchange for  the payment  ur  pw(s,t)  to the agent while  he 
is alive.  The  dynamic  budget conotraint  of the individual Ia thus 
(2)  (r(t)+p]w(s,t)+y(s,t)-T(t)-c(s,t)—r(t)m(s,t) 
The term r(t)m(s,t)  is subtracted from the  RHS of  (2)  because  only 
the  bond  component  of  w(s,t)  yields  interest  Subject to the 
appropriate transversality  condition,  the solution to this  problem 
from  the  first—order  conditions  when the only uncertainty concerns 
the time  of death can  be written as 
(3)  c(s.t)a(8+p)[w(s,t)+h(s,t)]  ,and 
(4)  m(s,t)  (l—)(8+p)  (w(s,t)÷h(s,t)) 
where h(s,t)  is human  wealth defined as 
(5)  h(s,t) 
Aggregation  over  consumers  can be dome  the hard way as in Sian— 
chard  (1985) or in the following  way,  If no agents died at time  t 
(in  which  case  the  insurance  industry  would go brankrupt) the 
evolution  of aggregate  wealth would be given by (2)  with aggregate 
variables substituting  for  individual  ones.  However every period  p 
individuals  die;  since  the probability  of death is independent  of 
age,  p  will  also  be  the  fraction  of aggregate  wealth that is 
tranferred  to  the  insurance  industry  Hence  in aggregation  the 
term pW(t)  (upper case  letters  denoting aggregates  over  consumers) 
must be  subtracted  from the budget  constraint,  which becomes: 7 
(6)  W(t}  - r(t)W(t)+Y(t)-T(t)-C(t)-r(t)M(t) 
where T(t)  is total  tax payments. 
Similar  reasoning  can  be applied  to human wealth. In this 
case,  however,  the  fraction  of  wealth that vanishes because p 
individuals  die  every period is immediately  replaced  by that of p 
individuals  who  are born.  The replacement  is one to one  because, 
by  assumption,  income  and  taxes  are  evenly distributed among 
consumers  of  different  age.  The  evolution  of aggregate human 
wealth is hence 
(7)  fiCt)  [r(t)+p]H(t)-EY(t)-T(t)1 
Aggregate  money demand and  consumption  will be given by 
(8)  C(t)  — (8+p)  A(t)  ,  and 
(9)  M(t)  — (l—)(8÷p)  A(t) 
where A(t)  is total wealth defined as 
(10)  A(t)  — H(t)  + A(t)  - 
The  model  is closed by the goods market equilibrium  condition 
(11)  Y—C+G, 
where G is government  consumption.  We assume that  the  central  bank 
intervenes  in  the  bond  market  so  as  keep  the interest rate 
constant  (r(t)  — r  for all  t);  this  assumption  allows  us to con- 
centrate  on movements  of the  IS schedule  of the system neglecting 
the feedbacks  from the LM. We finally  write 8 
(12) () a T(t) + iif(t) 
sq.  (12)  is  a  convenient  way  to paraneterise  a policy reaction 
function  for  luap sun taxes.  In the prelialnary  analysis of this 
paragraph  we  set  T(t) constant for all t: in this case eq.  (12) 
states  that  taxes are increised  as the le'iel of the public debt, 
lflt),  rises.  In  the following  sections  we  will neód  to consider 
nore general  paths for T(t). 
To  characterize  the dynanic  behaviour  of the systel,  we sun 
(6) and (7) using (8),  (9) and (10):  this  yieldS 
I 
(13)  A a (r—G)A—pW 
Using  (8),  (9),  (11) and (12), eq.  (6) becoaes 
I 
(14)  if a  —(y—r)if+G-T—(1—e)(O+p)A  . 
On  the systea (13) and  (14), we Sapose 
(15)  r—O)O,and 
(16)  y—r>O. 
Later  in this  section we  will discuss the reasons  why  these 
restrictions  are  inposed.  For the aoaent, we take  then as given 
and  describe  the  phase diagraa of the systea (Fig..  1) 9 





The A — 0  line  is the  locus  along  which  total  wealth  (A)  is 
constant;  since  from equation (8)  consumption  is proportional  to 
A,  along  this  schedule  consumption  is  constant  as well.  The 
equation for this schedule is obtained by setting  A equal  to  zero 
in  eq.  (13) and solving  for  A: 
(17) 
Eq.  (17) has  intercept  at  zero and a positive slope  (since r—8>0). 
The partial derivative  of  A  with  respect  to  A  is  positive: 
0 
therefore  the direction  of motion  around  the  A — 0  schedule  is 
unstable.  This  is  represented  in  Figure  1 by vertical arrows 
pointing away from the A — 0  line. 
0 
The downward  sloping  line  labelled  W  0  represents  the 
combinations  of A and W  which maintain the  debt  constant.  From eq. 
(14),  an increase  in the  debt  reduces W because of the  assumption 
that  taxes  are increased  by a factor  y which  is greater than  the 
rate  of interest.  Also an increase in A reduces W.  From  eq.  (9) 
the term (1—a)(O+p)A  on the  RHS of (14) is equal  to  rM:  an  in- 
crease  in  A  shifts  the  financing  of the deficit from bonds to 
C  0 
A  — 0  (C — 0) 
G-T 
y—  r 
w 10 
money, thus  allowing  the government to  on interest  payments. 
a 
Setting  W  0  in  equation  (14)  yields  the  expression  for the 
constant debt line: 
(18)  A  — 
(l—m)(8+p)  {Y_r  W ÷ G — 
T] 
a 
Around  the  q  0  line,  the  direction  of  motion  is  stable: 
horizontal  arrows  point  towards the line. 
In  conclusion,  the  dynamics of the  system  is saddle  point 
stable:  the  saddle path is line  SS in the  figure. 
We  now  explain  why  we  impose restriction  (15) and (16). 
Restriction  (15)  ensures  that  we are  considering  cases  in which 
the public debt is positive in the steady state,  This  is seen from 
eq.  (17):  if consumption  and therefore A are  positive,  the debt  is 
positive  only  if  r—8>0. We could of course  consider  the case 
which  the  government  is a net creditor in steady  state, but th.i 
is a less  interesting  case  and will be neglected. 
Restriction  (16)  is sufficient,  but  by no means necessary, 
to  ensure that the system  be a saddle point stable.  Solving for W 
from (17) and (18) yields 
(19)  w  —  (G.-T) 
where  is the determinant  of the  system: 
(20)  —  —  (y—r)(r—8)  — p(l—)p(e+p) 
Saddle  point  stability  requires that  the determinant  be negative. 
Hence  for  W to be positive,  G—T  must  also be positive.  When y=O, 
G—T  is  the  primary  deficit;  if it is positive  the  debt may be 
stable  only  if  in  steady  state  the  government  receives  net 11 
interest from the private sector,  i.e. money is larger  than wealth 
( small  in (20)) which implies that bonds are  negative.  If y is 
positive  the system  may both be stat1e  and have positive bonds  in 
steady  state  (for  which a necessary  and sufficient condition  is 
y  >  — --) ;  if it is greater than  r,  is negative and the system 
is  saddle  point  stable  regardless of the value of  (including  the 
case  when  —l  and  our  unbacked  currency  has  no value, as in 
Sargent, 1987,  chapt.  4.1). 
3.  The  Basic Results 
The  system  defined by eqs.  (13) and  (14)  is invariant  with 
respect  to  equal  changes  in  G and T. However  when G and  T are 
increased  by  equal  amounts income rises  from eq.  (11), the  goods 
market  equlibrium  condition.  The  balanced  budget multiplier is 
1  as  in the simple textbook model (on this  point see also Rankin 
(1987)  and  Frenkel  and Razin (1987)). 
0  If T rises more  than G, the w — 0  schedule  shifts  down  as 
in Figure  2. 
Fig.  2 
C, A 
Since expected net non—interest  disposable income  falls,  the 
human  wealth  component  of A immediately  falls  from E to S. Over 
0  A-C 
w 12 
time  the  public  debt  shrinks  and  so  dn  total  wealth  and 
consumption. 
If  at  point  B  income  is  unchanged  relative  to point  E 
(because  taxes  have  been raised in such  a way as to cause  a  fall 
in  consumption  which  equals  the  increase  in G),  it will neces- 
sarily be falling  further from point B to the new steady state E'. 
This  example  shows that  a once and  for all  change  in T does 
not  stabilize  income  continuously  when G is changed.  This  point 
can  be  made more  general in two ways.  First a single  change  in T 
does  not  stabilize  income,  in  the  face  of any shock  (interest 
rate,  u,  p,  8).  This  can  easily  be checked  graphically.  The  nore 
interesting  point  is  there  exists no pattern of T(t)  which can 
stabilize  income  continuously;  furthermore  the  time  it takes to 
stabilize income  is no smaller than the  time  it takes to stabilize 
the  public  debt.  The reverse is not  true;  the debt may be fixed 
while consumption  and income change. 
These  points  are easily  proved.  From eq.  (13) we know that 
A  0 implies  that  the level of the  debt  be  constant.  Recalling 
that  consumption  depends  only on A,  this means that consumption 
will  always  vary unless the  debt  is constant.  Since A is the  sum 
of  human  wealth  plus  the debt,  another  way of stating this point 
is  to  say  that under no circumstance  can  the variation  of human 
wealth  be equal  in size  and opposite  in sign  to that of the debt. 
To  illustrate  this  point,  suppose  for  a moment that there is no 
money  (u  1): in this  case  the dynamics of the debt (eq. 13)  is 
independent  of  A.  It  may  then  be  thought  that  it should  be 
possible  to  have  separate control  over  the dynamics of W and H. 
Current  taxes  can  be  used to control the dynamics of the debt, 
which  is  completely  independent  of future  taxes.  Given present 
taxes,  it may seem  that there should exist a future path of taxes 
that  causes current  human wealth  to vary,  at least  for some  time, 
in  such  a  way  as  to keep  the sum of human wealth and the debt 
constant.  Eq.  (13) tells  us that this  is not possible (regardless 13 
of whether a is equal  or greater than  zero). 
This  point is much more general than the model used in this 
paper:  eq.  (13)  is  derived exclusively  from  aggregation  of the 
first—order  conditions  of individual consumers.  It holds as well 
in  models  with flexible  prices and market  clearing,  or in models 
in  which  there  is  a  foreign  sector or labour  is not  the only 
factor  of  production.  The  only  thing  that would change  is the 
definition of W, which,  in more complex  models,  could  no longer  be 
indentified with the public debt. 
In  this  model,  an  immediate  implication  is  that  if G 
changes,  consumption  will  start  to vary over  time,  unless  P is 
changed by the  same amount (so as to keep W  0);  if this  is  done 
however income  increases. 
Concerning  the  sign  of the  change  in consumption,  it can be 
shown  that  if  r,  p  and  S are  constant  any  fiscal policy which 
causes  the  debt  not  to fall  at any time  (rise) and  to increase 
(decrease)  at  least  sometimes,  will  cause  consumption  to 
continuously  increase  (decrease>  at  all  times.  This  is  the 
following 
proposition:  let  w(t0,v)  be  the  level of the debt expected for 
time  v,  as  of  time  t0 
and (v, v+5)  be the change in the  debt 
expected to occur between  v and v+6,  i.e. 
A(v,v+6)  W(t0,v+) 
— W(t0,v) 
A(v,v÷6)  >  0 for  all  6>0  and v>t0 
and  A(v,v÷6)  >  0  for some  6>0  and v>t0 
then 
A(t+6)  — A(t)  >  0  for  all  t0  < t  <  v+&  and  6  >  0 14 
where v+ is the last period in which wealth rises. 
Proof.  Integrating  (13) forward  yields 
A(t)  f 
e  _8)(t_v) 
pW(t0,v)dv  Je_(r_epw(t0,t+v)dv 
Similarly 
A(t+&)  J  e8pw(t0,t÷8÷v)dv 
which can be written as 
(21)  A(t+6)  f  e_(  8)Vp(w(tt+v)  +  (t+v,t+v+6))dv 
A(t)  + j; e9'pA(t÷v,t÷v+8)dv 
Since (.,.) is never  negative  A(t+6) > A(t).  If t is smaller than 
the last time in which (.,.) is  positive  A(t+6) > A(t). 
4.  Interpretation 
The  results  of  the  previous  section are  somewhat  puzzling 
for  two  reasons. 
First,  they are at variance with what one  can obtain from a 
traditional  consumption  function;  this  is often written in  a form 
like 
(22)  C  c[Y—T,W] l 
In (22) there always  exist a level  and  rate of change  of  T  that 
holds C constant at any desired level when W  0. 
Second, from a mathematical  point  of view,  there are  as many 
independent  instruments  Cone  tax  for each  period)  as there  are 
targets (income  in each period). The mathematical  puzzle is easily 
resolved  noting  that  the  target  can  be attained  continuously 
moving  the  instruments  by an infinite  amount:  if wealth taxes can 
be  levied  (which  is the  same  as setting the flow of T equals  to 
infinity),  then  wealth  can  instantly  be brought  to the desired 
steady  state.  A  surprise  wealth  tax  (or  subsidy)  solves the 
problem of the debt and that of the stabilization  of income at the 
same time. 
From the  economic  point  of view,  the  lack of controllability 
of  the  system  derives critically from  the assumption  that agents 
know future policies. 
If  we  relax  this  assumption,  agents  will  maximize (1) 
subject  to  (2)  and aggregate  consumption  and wealth will still  be 
given by (8) and  (14). Human wealth will  not however accumulate  as 
in  eq.  (7). The discounted  value of expected  net income  will  have 
to be written as 
(23)  H(t)  - J  [Y(t,v) — T(t,v)Je+(t_dv 
where Y(•)  and T(.)  now depend on  t,  the  time when the  expectation 
is taken.  Differentiating  (23) with respect  to  t and assuming that 
the present is known (so that Y(t,t)  — Y(t)  etc.), yields 
(24)  H(t)  - -  [Y(t)  — TCt)J  +  (r÷p)  H(t)  ÷ Y(t)  ,  where 
(25)  T(t)  -  [Y(t,v)  — T(t,v)J  e+(t_dv 
Y(t)  represents  the  revision of expectations  as new information 16 
comes  in. Proceeding  as before  we can add  (6)  and (24), using (8) 
and (9);  this yields 
(26)  A  (r—9) A — pW  + Y(t) 
The  presence  of  the surprise  term Y(t)  in (26) suggests  that it 
should  now be possible  to control the level and the dynamics of A 
independently  of  W.  We  pursue this  idea and assume that  agents 
have  rational  expectations  in the sense that  they compute future 
income  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with the model;  they may 
however  be  wrong in their  forecasts  of future  taxes.  Under  these 
assumptions,  we  can  derive  a consumption  function which is very 
similar to  (22). 
The  solution  is  obtained  as follows.  We first compute the 
value  of  A(t)  which is consistent  with the model,  given  W(t)  and 
agents  expectations  about future  taxes.  In the Appendix,  we show 
that this  is given by 
(27)  A(t)  — L [W(t)+f(t)] 
,  and 
vi 
(28)  f(t) —  e_X2(t)(G_T(t,v)]dv 
where  T(t,v)  is the expectation  of T at tine v, as of time 
is the unstable root of the system (eqs (13) and (14)). v1 
is the 
first  element  of the  right eigenvector  associated  with the  stable 
root (X1) 
r—  e— 
(29)  v1— 
. 
Since  r—8>Q and X<O, V1 is  positive. 
Equations  (27) and  (28) determine consumption  at each  point 
in time.  (13> determines  the evolution  of the debt. 17 
Next  we  formulate  a rule  according  to which agents revise 
their expectations.  For  instance,  suppose  that agents believe that 
T will  gradually  evolve  from  its  current  value  to  a  fixed 
value : 
(30>  T(t,v)  — X[T(t)—j  ;  X  > 0 
Since total  taxes  T are given by T plus  the  term  yW,  eq.  (30> 
implies  that  agents believe that  taxes  tend  toward  a value which 
is given by a constant  plus  an increasing  function  of the  level 
of  the debt.  Integrating  (30>, substituting  the  result  in (26i and 
integrating  again yields 
31  ft  G  T(t>  _____ 
> 
>2 
—  — 
X22+X) 
If  X  0,  agents simply consider current T as permanent. 
Substituting  (31>  and  (27)  into  the  consumption  function 
yields 
(32>  C(t)  — n0  [wt+— 
—  —  22> }  ,  where 
—  p(1—a)(jp  a(8+p>  >  0  1—a  (r '  1  1—a  r—8—X1  V1 
Substituting (11>  and (12> in (32) yields 
(33)  —  +  (Y—T) + 
n3 (T—)  ,  with 
x2 n0  X 
X2t0 
> 0  2  X2+n0 
>  0 
113  (X2+n0)(X2+X) 
>  0 
With  constant  parameters  and  X  0,  (33>  is  a  particular 
functional  form  of  (22)  and  closely resembles  the  consumption 
function estimated  in Ando and Modigliani (1963). 18 
The  main  point is that  in (33), as well  as in (22),  wealth 
and  taxes  appear  separately  so that  the system  can be  controlled 
continuously  through  taxes  at any desired level  of consumption and 
therefore  of income. 
From (32) and the goods market condition (11), one can solve 
for  T(t)  as  a  function  of  the  desired level  of income 
Substituting  then into  the debt accumulation  equation (14),  after 
A  has  been  expressed  as  a  function  of  and G, yields the 
following  stable  differential  equation,  which  completely 
characterizes  the  dynamics  of  the  system  under discretionary 
policies. 
—  A  1* 
W  — a  W — (G—T) —  +  IY  —G) 
where  •+  A2  + A—  r >0. 
The  implication  is that a loss  function  of the form 
(34)  L(t) 
ft1yt_y*J2et_dv 
can be set  equal  to its minimum value (zero), through appropriate 
tax  policies,  for any Y  and any shock  that hits  the system. As  in 
Kydland  and  Prescott (1977)  and Calvo (1978) the optimal plan is 
time  inconsistent. 
5.  The Suboptimality  of Discretiom 
We  now  revert  to  the assumption  that  agents have correct 
forecasts  of  future  taxes and show that  the path  for taxes which 
has been derived in section 4 is suboptimal. 
Consider the following  expression  for T(t): (35)  T(t)  — 
B..  +  W(t) 
Substituting  (35)  into  (32),  using  (11), we can  solve  for  the 
values 
B0  and  B1,  as  a  function of target  income  (y*)  which 
result  under the assumption  that  the government  reoptimizes  every 
period. 
*  v1X2 
(36)  B0  G + [G—Y  1 
(37)  l 
We now  show that  setting B1  >'2 
is not  optimal  in the  sense 
that it does not minimize the  loss  function (eq. 34). 
Suppose  that  the government commits itself to  a tax  rule  of 
the  form  of (35). Using (27)  the equation for  the saddle  path can 
then be written  as 
(38)  A(t)  — 
v0  + v'W(t) 
where v0 is a constant.  We can  hence  write 
(39)  A(t)  A* — e)i(t_to)  vl  {W(tQ)_w*] 
where  A  and  W  are  the steady  state  levels of A and W when Y = 
Given  the  relation between 
A1 (the  speed of adjustment  of the 
system)  and  v1  (eq. 29),  for any t we have that A(t)  — A*  (hence 
Y(t)  — y*)  is smaller  the larger A1 in absolute  value.  In turn  the 
relation between  and l  is given by 
(40)  A1 
{(r_Y_1) 
+ (r-e)  — (9)2  4p(l-)(O+p) 
} 20 
is a monotonically  decreasing function of ,; moreover  it is 
unbounded, i.e. 
(41)  urn  — 
— 
The  limiting  case  in which  is set  equal  to infinity  cor- 
responds  to  a  wealth  tax;  in this  case  the system  jumps  imme- 
diately  to  the steady  state.  Wealth is no longer  a predetermined 
variable because  the  flow  of taxes  is unbounded. 
In  conclusion  the  formal  solution to the problem  of mini- 
mizing  the  loss  function  is to set  equal to infinity.  If this 
is  not  feasible  it  still  remains  true  that  if the authorities 
commit  themselves  to a rule  like  (35) with l  larger  than  X2 they 
can  attain  a  lower  value  of  the  loss  function  than  under 
discretion. 21 
Appendix 
To  derive  eqs.  (27) and (28)  of section 4 we first  compute 
the  standard  rational expectation solution  of the model and show 
how  it should be modified to allow for suprises. 
Consider the following  differential  system 
(1)  Dx(t)  e mx(t) + C  2(t) 
x(t)  is  a  2xl  vector of state variables, aCt)  an nxl vector  of 
forcing  or exogenous  variables.  B  and C are constant  matrixes  and 
D  is the linear differential  operator.  for the model of this paper 
the  elements of x(t)  are W(t) and  ACt), aCt)  is the scalar  G—T(t) 
and  C — transpose  (1,01. 
Since  the  aodel  has  two  distinct  roots,  S  can  be 
diagonalised  by' a similarity  transformation 
(2)  A—v1mv. 
V  is a 2x2 matrix of eigeavectors  of B and  A is a  diagonal  matrix 
whose diagonal elements  are the eigenvalues  C  0  and 12> 0). 
Let 
(3)  puC1x. 
Then  (1) can  be written  as 
(4)  Dp(t)  — Ap(t) + v'  C  s(t) 
or 
(Sa)  Dp1(t) a 11p1(t)  + u1  C s(t)  •  and 22 
(5b)  Dp2(t)  X2p2(t) 
+ u2  C z(t) 
where  u1  and u2 are  the  first and second row of V', Normalizing 
the second  row  of V to be equal  to I we have 
v_i 
1  1  —V2 
v1—v2  L—i 
where  v1 
and 
v2 
are  the elements  of the  first  row of V  Postmul— 
tiplication  by C yields 
u1Cz(t)  z(t)  ,  and 
vl.-v2 
u2Cz(t) 
—  1 
z(t) 
vi_v2 
Since  > 0,  we solve  (Sb) forward  to obtain 
(6)  p2(t)  e2t  k2 + 12 JteX2t_zt,vdv 
where  z(t,v)  is the value of  z expected for time  v as of time  t. 
For  p2(t)  to  be  bounded,  it  is required  that k2  0.  (Sa) is 
solved backward to obtain 




where  z(t,v)  — z(v)  for v  t by the assumption  that  the  past  and 
the present are known. 
It  is  important  to note  that t0 is the time  when the  last 
surprise  occurred.  This means that in (6)  z(t,v) = z(t0,v)  since 
t  >  to. The value  of k1 is derived from initial condition  at t = 
to  for the predetermined  variable  W(t). 
Evaluating  the  first  row of  (3)  at t = to  yields 23 
(8)  — p1(t0)  —  W(t0) 
-  p(t0) 
Note  that  since  W is predetermined,  while A is not,  k1 jumps  at 
t0.  (6),  (7)  and  (8)  are the solutions  of the problem Cx can be 
obtained  postrecursively  inverting  (3)) when  no surprises  occur 
between t0 and t. 
If  surprises  occur  and  do so in continuous  time,  the system 
is still  valid  with the caveat  that  t = t0;  therefore 
k1 will vary 
with t: 
V 
(8')  k1(t)  -  w(t)  -  p2(t)  V1  V1 
Setting t 
to 
in  (7)  and using (8') yields 
(7')  p1(t)  k1(t) 
Given the normalization  of V,  X  Vp  is written in scalar form  as 
(9a)  W(t>  — v1p1(t)  + v2p2(t) 
,  and 
(9b)  A(t)  — p1(t) 
+ p2(t) 
Substituting  (8') in (9b} yields 
(10)  A(t)  —  W(t)  —  p2(t)  + p2(t) 
— — W(t)  +  12 
p2(t) 
Using (6)  in (10), yields 
(11)  A(t)  — — [w(t)+f(t)] 
,  and 
(12)  f(t)=$eX2(t(G_T(t,v))dv 24 
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